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The Effects of Self-Esteem 
Abstract 
The present study examined the psychological processes underlying 
the self-serving bjas, the tendency to portray one's own qualities as 
more favorable then those of others. Subjects were asked to predict 
future success on a behavioral task for themselves and for the average 
student at their university after receiving performance feedback on the 
same task. It was proposed that self-enhancing predictions would be 
moderated by subject's self-esteem (high or low), the verifiability of 
task performance (high or low), and performance feedback (success or 
failure). The results revealed that subjects with high self-esteem 
displayed a self-serving bias regardless of performance verifiability or 
feedback. Subjects with low self-esteem, however, self-enhanced only 
for tasks low in verifiabBity and showed a slight self-enhancing trend 
when receiving success feedback. The results are discussed in terms of 
depressive realism, verifiability theory, and self-consistency theory. 
Implications for teaching positive cognitive strategies to low 
self-esteem individuals are discussed. 
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The Effects of Self-Esteem, Performance Feedback, 
and Behavioral Verifiability on Self-Serving Biases 
Until recently, individuals with low self-esteem were thought to 
possess a distorted view of themselves and their social world. 
Depressives were theorized to be motivated to heighten their 
self-image by derogating others and distorting or enhancing their 
self-perception (Jones, 1973; Wills, 1981 ). Alternatively, they were 
believed to be more likely to downgrade themselves (Beck, 1967) and 
overestimate other's abilities (Martin, Abramson & Alloy, 1984). In a 
dramatic departure from these ideas, current research suggests that 
depressed or low self-esteem individuals are more accurate or 
realistic than those with average or high self-esteem. Studies now 
show that depressed individuals are more accurate in recognizing 
personal level of social skills (Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, & Barton, 
1980), absolute versus relative improvement in test scores (Campbell, 
Fairey, & Fehr, 1986), true differences between self and other's test 
scores (Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & lngerman, 1987), and predicting 
future success (Alloy, 1987). 
The Self-Serving Bias and Qepressjye Realism 
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The self-serving bias and depressive realism have been proposed to 
explain information processing tendencies displayed by individuals 
with high and low self-esteem. Research indicates that people with 
average or high self-esteem display self-enhancing illusions, and that 
people with low self-esteem may actually hold veridical perceptions of 
themselves and their social surroundings. In addressing 
self-perceptions of social competency, Lewinsohn et al. (1980) asked 
normal, psychiatric-nondepressed, and depressed subjects to assess 
their social skills following their participation in an observed 20 
minute social group function. As rated by blind coders, the depressed 
individuals were obviously more deficient in their skills than the 
normal controls. However, when comparing the subjects' ratings with 
those of the coders, the depressed individuals assessed their lack of 
skills accurately while the nondepressed subjects (normal and 
psychiatric) over-rated their abilities. This ability to recognize the 
truth, although negative, by individuals with low self-esteem is 
referred to as depressive realism. 
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In another study, Alloy and Ahrens (1987) asked depressed and 
nondepressed college students to make predictions regarding their own 
and their classmates' futures. They found that while depressed 
subjects were more pessimistic than nondepressed subjects in 
predicting their own futures, the depressed were equally as 
pessimistic about everyone else's future. This global pessimistic 
theme, as well as lowered self-esteem, is considered one of the key 
traits of depression (Beck, 1967). Nondepressed students, on the other 
hand, showed evidence of a self-serving bias in that their forecasts 
were more positive for themselves than for others. 
Further evidence for depressive realism was obtained by Crocker et 
al. (1987), who manipulated test feedback (success or failure) to high, 
medium, and low self-esteem subjects. When asked to rate themselves 
and other subjects on a number of traits, subjects in the high 
self-esteem group receiving failure feedback tended to derogate the 
other subjects. Apparently, when high self-esteem individuals are 
faced with ego threatening information, the self-serving bias kicks in 
to restore the self-perception, allowing individuals to maintain their 
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healthy level of self-esteem. This perspective suggests that 
self-enhancement may be motivated by perceived attacks on the self 
(Brown, Collins, & Schmidt, 1988). Moreover, it suggests that people 
arrange their social environments so as to be consistent with their 
self-views. The role of self-consistency motivation in the 
maintenance of one's present level of self-esteem is discussed next. 
Self-Consistency Theory 
Self-consistency refers to the notion that people attempt to control 
and predict their world by behaving in ways that perpetuate and 
confirm their self-perceptions (Swann, 1987; Swann, Griffin, 
Predmore, & Gains, 1987). From this perspective, people utilize at 
least two strategies to sustain their self-beliefs. First, they can 
create social environments that foster the survival of their self-view. 
They can do this by strategically choosing partners and social settings 
(Swann & Pelham, 1987), displaying identity cues (Schlenker, 1980), or 
utilizing interaction strategies (Swann & Read, 1981 ). The second way 
that people sustain their self-beliefs is to see more self-confirmatory 
evidence than actually exists. They do this by selectively attending to 
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(Swann & Read, 1981 ), retrieving (Crary, 1966), and interpreting 
(Markus, 1977) information that is consistent with their self-concept. 
In a test of self-consistency theory, Swann et al. (1987) had 
subjects who were either high or low in self-esteem deliver a 
pre-written speech. Subjects were then given feedback in terms of 
their social abilities (high or low/self-confidence, comfort around 
others, and social competence) as rated by an observer. Following the 
feedback session, subjects were asked to rate the accuracy and 
competence of the observer. The results supported the consistency 
model in that subjects receiving feedback that confirmed their 
self-esteem (high self-esteem/high social abilities or low 
self-esteem/low social abilities) rated the observers as more accurate 
and competent. Other studies demonstrating self-enhancement for high 
self-esteem but not for low self-esteem individuals can also be 
further understood in terms of the self-consistency model. 
A novel study by Campbell et al. (1986) compared the attention 
placed on relative or absolute information as a function of self-esteem. 
These researchers gave high and low self-esteem subjects feedback as 
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to how they and a friend performed on two tests. In one condition, the 
subjects' results were not very good, although they were better than 
their friends' performance. This was the relative condition; compared 
to the friend the subject did relatively well. In the absolute condition, 
the subjects' test results were better than in the relative condition but 
lower than their friends' absolute condition test results. Thus, 
although the subject did poorer than the friend on the second test, the 
results were an improvement over the first test. When asked to rate 
their success, subjects with high self-esteem stated they had done 
better in the relative condition, supporting the need for 
self-enhancement through social comparison. The low self-esteem 
group, however, reported greater success in the absolute condition, a 
judgment based on objective fact rather than a self-serving strategy. 
In support of the self-consistency theory, it may be that because low 
self-esteem individuals do not expect to do well and those with high 
self-esteem do, each individual attended to the information that best 
verified their self-perception. 
The Effects of Self-Esteem 
9 
Although depressive realism theory and self-consistency theory 
have both received considerable empirical support, we should note that 
an interesting discrepancy exists with regard to how the two theories 
propose that low self-esteem individuals perceive their worlds. The 
self-consistency model states that both low and high self-esteem 
individuals modify and distort reality in order to maintain a view that 
is consistent with their self-image. Depressive realism, on the other 
hand, states that low self-esteem people are realistic in their 
perceptions and that high self-esteem individuals are the ones who 
distort reality in a self-serving direction. Resolving this theoretical 
discrepancy is one of the goals of the present research. 
Verifiability Theory 
A third relevant theoretical position that proposes conditions under 
which self-serving biases are most likely to emerge is behavioral 
verifiability theory. From this perspective, actions that are high in 
verifiability are less susceptible to self-serving biases. To illustrate, 
intelligence and athletic ability are verifiable because one can take a 
test or play a game and objectively determine one's level of ability. 
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Social or moral behaviors, however, are not as verifiable because there 
are no clear, objective measures as to higher or lower social or moral 
behaviors (as an IQ score for intelligence). As a result of this 
differential verifiability, people should be more likely to exaggerate 
their moral qualities than their intellectual ones. 
Support for this model has been provided in both a social (Brown et 
al., 1988) and cognitive dimension (Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 1989; 
Van Lange, 1990). Brown et al. argue that everyone is in need of 
self-enhancement. Due to the need for self-consistency, however, high 
and low self-esteem individuals pursue this goal differently. To 
illustrate this idea, Brown et al. conducted a study in which subjects 
were divided into groups and then the groups were divided once again. 
They were therefore direct members of this last group but vicarious 
members of the group formed by the first split. Each group was to 
complete a creativity task and then to rate the results produced by 
each group. In support of the verifiability model, high self-esteem 
subjects showed favoritism for the group in which they were directly 
involved. This self-serving bias of a highly verifiable nature (they 
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~group members) in no way threatened their positive self-view; 
rather, it maintained consistency. Subjects with low self-esteem, 
however, showed favoritism for the group in which they were vicarious 
members (low verifiability); therefore, the success was not directly 
attributable to them. This form of indirect self-enhancement also 
maintains consistency. The low self-esteem individuals were not 
taking personal credit for the success, thereby not threatening their 
low self-concept. 
This same distinction is made when subjects are asked to compare 
themselves and others on behaviors reflecting intelligence or morality. 
Verifiability theory would predict larger self-enhancing biases for 
morality, a nonverifiable quality, than for intelligence, a verifiable one. 
To test this idea, Allison et al. (1989) had subjects ascribe the 
probability of performing different moral and intelligent acts for 
themselves and others. As expected, a greater self-serving bias was 
found for those behaviors that were not verifiable. That is, subjects 
rated themselves as more likely to perform moral acts than others but 
no more likely to perform intelligent acts. Allison et al. proposed that 
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the self-serving bias is limited by the "publicity, specificity and 
objectivity of the dimensions on which these beliefs are held" (p. 275). 
In a similar study, Van Lange (1990) had subjects write 2 stories, 
one about how an example of their behavior has affected another, and 
the other about how someone else's behavior has affected them. 
Subjects then rated the 2 stories for moral and intelligent content. 
Consistent with Allison et al.'s (1989) findings, subjects showed a 
self-serving bias by rating their behavior as better than the other 
person's, and this was especially true for the moral dimension. Van 
Lang and Allison et al. explain this effect as illustrating people's need 
to maintain positive rather than negative self-views. This 
self-serving belief, however, must be truthful to be believable. 
Truthful in this sense may refer to not being able to be proven false, 
and is thus limited to a nonverifiable quality such as morality. 
The Present Study 
In attempting to identify the process by which self-serving biases 
are moderated by levels of self-esteem, researchers have overlooked an 
important issue. As mentioned above, predictions generated from the 
The Effects of Self-Esteem 
1 3 
depressive realism perspective differ from those based on 
self-consistency theory. Specifically, these two theoretical positions 
differ in their view of how depressives an non-depressives perceive 
and interpret positive and negative events. If self-consistency is 
operating, then depressives should renounce their successes while 
non-depressives should acknowledge theirs. But if depressive realism 
is operating, then depressives should acknowledge their successes 
whereas non-depressives should exaggerate theirs. 
Not only should successful or unsuccessful outcomes affect 
self-serving tendencies, but the verifiability of those outcomes should 
also play a central role. The present study assumes, along with Allison 
et al. (1989), that moral aptitude is less verifiable than intellectual 
aptitude. Half of the subjects were classified as having high 
self'."esteem, whereas the other half were classified as having low 
self-esteem. Moreover, half the subjects were given an intelligence 
test while the other half were tested on-their moral qualities. 
Subjects were given either success or-failure feedback about their 
performances and then asked to predict future success or failure on the 
same test for themselves and for their classmates. 
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In order to maintain a consistent self-image, individuals with high 
self-esteem were expected to exhibit a greater self-serving bias for 
both verifiable (intelligence test) and nonverifiable (morals test) 
dimensions than were low self-esteem subjects. In support of the 
self-consistency model and self-enhancement theory, it was predicted 
that those with high self-esteem receiving information contrary to 
their self-concept (failure feedback), would be most likely to 
exaggerate the expected differences between themselves and others in 
order to reestablish their self-perception. Individuals with high 
self-esteem receiving success feedback were also expected to show a 
self-serving bias but not to the extent predicted for high self-esteem 
subjects presented with failure feedback. 
As predicted by the self-consistency and verifiability models, those 
with low self-esteem were not expected to exhibit a self-serving bias 
in the verifiable (intelligence test) dimension. It was unclear whether 
low self-esteem subjects would show self-enhancement in the 
nonverifiable (morals test) situation, as predicted by the verifiability 
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model, or if they would maintain a negative self-view, as predicted by 
the self-consistency model. Low self-esteem subjects receiving 
failure feedback consistent with their self-image were expected to 
predict similar low test results for themselves and others due to their 
general pessimistic view. It was it was also unclear whether 
individuals with low self-esteem receiving success feedback would be 
able to recognize this positive achievement and predict success for 
themselves, as predicted by depressive realism theory, or if they would 
derogate the differences between predicted outcomes for themselves 
and others in order to maintain their self-view, as predicted by 
self-consistency theory. If any self-enhancement by low self-esteem 
individuals was to be seen, it was expected from those receiving 
success feedback in the nonverifiable (morals test} dimension. 
Method 
Subjects 
The subjects were 36 high (12 male and 24 female} and 41 low (9 
male and 32 female} self-esteem psychology students from the 
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University of Richmond who participated to fulfill their course 
requirement.1 
Design 
This study employed a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design, with subjects' 
self-esteem (high or low), test feedback (success or failure), and test 
dimension (intelligence or morals) as between-subjects factors. 
Materials 
Subjects self-esteem was assessed with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
Inventory (Rosenberg, 1965). This latter scale is a well-validated 
private, global evaluation of the self. The inventory contains 1 O items 
on which the subjects rate their level of agreement on a 4 point scale. 
Reported test-retest reliabilities are greater than .80 (Wylie, 1979). 
Possible scores on the Rosenberg inventory range from 1 O to 40. 
Subjects in the intelligence test condition were administered one of 
the analytic sections from a practice book for the Graduate Record 
Exam (Brownstein, Weiner, Green, & Hilbert, 1990). See Appendix A for 
a copy of this test. subjects in the morals test condition were given 
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20 moral dilemmas from the game Scruples (Milton Bradley Company, 
1987). See Appendix B for a copy of these questions. 
Procedure 
During the first week of their Introductory Psychology course at the 
University of Richmond, students completed a demographics 
questionnaire and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory (Rosenberg, 
1965). Students were designated as either high or low self-esteem via 
a median split. Due to the homogeneity and affluence of the student 
population, it was not surprising to find 74°/o of the original subject 
pool above 30 on this self-esteem scale. The final high and low 
self-esteem groups thus consisted of scores ranging from 36 to 40 and 
17 to 33 respectively. It must be noted, however, that of the 41 
subjects in the low self-esteem group, 3 were below 21 and the rest 
ranged from 24 to 33. Within the next 2 to 3 weeks students were 
solicited based on their test scores. 
To establish a relationship made between low self-esteem and 
depression, subjects were first administered the Beck Depression 
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Inventory (801) (Beck, 1967). The 801 is a well validated measure of 
enduring depressive symptoms (Hammen, 1980) . 
One half of the subjects were then given the intelligence test, 
whereas the other half were given the morals test. Following the test 
subjects were given an unrelated filler task while waiting for their 
results. Half of the high and half of the low self-esteem subjects 
randomly received positive feedback (93% correct for intelligence 
measure or 93% achievement of moral development for adults) and the 
other half received negative feedback (48% correct for intelligence 
measure or 48% achievement of moral development for adults). 
Importance of confidentiality was stressed. To prevent leakage, the 
feedback was distributed in envelopes and subjects were instructed not 
to discuss it with each other. Subjects were told that this study 
represented an effort to establish norms for a test currently used in 
many universities for consideration for adoption at the present 
university. 
Upon receipt of the results, students completed a short 
questionnaire in which they were asked how well they believed they 
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would perform next semester on the same test, and how well the 
average student at the University of Richmond would perform. As a 
manipulation check, subjects were asked to indicate how well they 
believed they performed on the test. 
To reduce any possible negative side effects associated with 
participating in this study, subjects were debriefed immediately 
concerning the nature and purpose of the deception. We also probed for 
subjects' suspiciousness of the true intent of the study. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
As a manipulation check, subjects were asked, "How well do you 
believe you performed on this test?" Subjects were asked to provide a 
number from o to 100. These data were analyzed using a one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). A significant difference between the 
two feedback groups was found, F (1, 75) = 61.31, Q. < .00001. Results 
indicate that subjects receiving success feedback believed they had 
performed better (M = 83.57) than subjects receiving failure feedback 
(M = 54.25). 
Belatjonshjp Between Self-Esteem and Depressjon 
The Effects of Self-Esteem 
20 
A Pearson-product moment correlation was computed to determine 
the relationship between the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory and the 
Beck Depression Inventory. The correlation was found to be 
statistically significant (B =-.54, J2<.01 ), indicating that the lower the 
subjects' self-esteem, the greater their level of depression. This 
result suggests that self-esteem may be an enduring quality within 
individuals rather than a temporary or situation specific mood state. 
Subjects Performance Predictions 
To determine how well subjects believed they would perform on a 
future morals or intelligence test compared to others, we computed a 2 
(Self-Esteem: high, low) X 2 (Dimension: intelligence, morality) X 2 
(Feedback: success, failure) X 2 (Target: self, other) ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the last factor. The results revealed several 
statistically significant effects. 
First, a main effect for feedback was found, E (1, 69) = 84. 78, 
P,<.00001. Subjects receiving success feedback had overall higher 
predictions (M = 84.51) than subjects receiving failure feedback (M = 
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58.21 ). While this finding is not relevant to our central hypotheses, it 
validates the credibility of the feedback. A main effect was also found 
for target, F (1, 69) = 11.54, 12..< .01. Overall subjects predicted better 
success for themselves (M = 73.80) than for their classmates (M = 
68.92). This result illustrates people's self-serving tendency to 
believe that they are better than others. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------.... ----.. ---··· .. -. ---~ 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------------------------·· ---...... ----------· ·---
Two significant interactions were also obtained. First, there was an 
interaction between self-esteem and target, E (1, 69) = 4.95, Q < .03. 
The means associated with this interaction are displayed in Table 1. 
As this table shows, the self-serving bias reported above was 
operating for subjects with high self-esteem but not for subjects with 
low self-esteem. A simple effects test corroborates this 
interpretation. Subjects with high self-esteem indicated that they 
would perform significantly better on a future test (M = 77.01) than 
would others (M = 68.93), F (1, 69)) = 15.14, p < .001. In contrast, 
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subjects with low self-esteem indicated that they would perform 
roughly the same on a future test (M = 70.59) as would others (M = 
68.91 ), F <1. This finding supports our hypothesis that self-serving 
biases are moderated by levels of self-esteem. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------. -· ...... ·-. -- -
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------------------------.. ·---~ ......... --
Second, there was a dimension by target interaction F (1, 69) = 4.56, 
g, < .04. The means associated with this interaction are displayed in 
Table 2. As predicted by the verifiability model, subjects were more 
likely to show a self-serving bias for the nonverifiable dimension, 
morality, than for the verifiable dimension, intelligence. This 
interpretation is further supported by a test of simple effects. 
Subjects who took the morals test predicted that they would perform 
significantly better on a future test (M = 77.30) than would others (M = 
69.35), E (1, 69) = 16.70, Q < .0001. However, subjects who took the 
intelligence test predicted that on future tests they would do about the 
same (M = 70.30) as would others (M..= 68.49), F < 1. This finding 
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supports the hypothesis that the self-serving bias is further moderated 
by the verifiability of the task dimension. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- ""' - - - - - - • - .. *' - .. -
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------------------------. -.. --.. --- -~ 
Two three-way interactions were found to be marginally significant. 
First, there was a three-way interaction between self-esteem, 
dimension, and target, F (1, 69) = 3.47, Q < .07. The means associated 
with this interaction are displayed in Table 3. This effect indicates 
that subjects with high self-esteem showed a large self-serving bias 
regardless of dimension. However, subjects with low self-esteem 
showed a significant self-serving bias for the moral dimension but not 
for the intelligence dimension. This finding suggests that although 
subjects with low self-esteem are sensitive to the verifiability of a 
behavioral dimension, subjects with high self-esteem are not. 
----------------------------------------------------------------· -·-----. ---.. -. . -
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------------------·- ---------.. -- ... -
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Finally, there was a marginal three-way interaction between 
self-esteem, feedback, and target, F (1, 69) = 2.99, Q. < .09. The means 
associated with this interaction are displayed in Table 4. Subjects 
with high self-esteem showed a self-serving bias regardless of 
feedback, i.e., both success and failure feedback engendered 
self-enhancing tendencies. However, the trend suggests that low 
self-esteem individuals receiving success feedback tended to 
self-enhance, whereas low self-esteem individuals receiving failure 
feedback showed no tendency to self-enhance. This again offers 
tentative support for depression realism. 
Discussion 
The theory underlying the present research states that while all 
individuals may need to feel good about themselves through 
self-enhancement (Brown et al., 1988), only individuals with high 
self-esteem are equipped with the mechanism to do so directly. 
Individuals with low self-esteem, on the other hand, show depressive 
realism in that they are as negative about themselves as they are about 
others (Alloy et al., 1987). The ability to self-enhance was proposed to 
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be further modulated by the verifiability of the task being described 
(Allison et al., 1989). It was therefore predicted that individuals with 
high self-esteem would show a greater self-serving bias than 
individuals with low self-esteem. Additionally, a greater self-serving 
bias was expected when the task was low in verifiability, as in the 
morals test, and thus less susceptible to being disproven than a task 
high in verifiability such as the intelligence test. 
We were also interested in the pattern of subjects' predictions in 
response to success or failure feedback. Based on self-consistency 
theory (Swann et al. 1987), it was expected that subjects would 
predict scores for themselves and others that were consistent with the 
way they viewed themselves. Subjects receiving information contrary 
to their self-image (success feedback for low self-esteem and failure 
feedback for high self-esteem) would then need to predict scores for 
themselves and others that would reestablish a consistent view. Thus 
low self-esteem subjects make lower predictions for themselves 
compared to others, and high self-esteem subjects would show a 
reverse pattern, namely, a self-serving bias. Subjects receiving 
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information consistent with their self-concept, thereby verifying their 
self-esteem were not expected to have much of a discrepancy in their 
self-other predictions. 
Overall, the data substantiated several of these predictions. For 
subjects' with high self-esteem, the findings supported a self-serving 
bias and the self-consistency model. Moreover, verifiability theory did 
not hold for these subjects, as they tended to inflate their predicted 
success over their predictions for others regardless of feedback 
(success or failure) or task dimension (intelligence or morals), 
supporting a self-serving bias. As predicted by the self-consistency 
model, they showed a greater self-enhancement upon receiving failure 
feedback, thus reasserting or verifying their superior position. It was 
of great interest to find that these high self-esteem individuals were 
willing to self-enhance in the face of failure even when the task 
dimension was verifiable (intelligence test). 
Behavior of individuals with low self-esteem appeared to be 
governed by depressive realism when the task was verifiable 
(intelligence test), but they were able to show a self-serving bias 
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when the task was nonverifiable (morals test). In other words, these 
individuals may possess motivations to self-enhance but not at the risk 
of getting caught (Allison et al., 1989). These low self-esteem 
subjects were therefore sensitive to the dimension on which they 
· self-enhanced. 
Low self-esteem subjects, however, did not have the resource found 
in those with high self-esteem (a self-serving bias) when given failure 
feedback, but rather, showed a global pessimism (Beck, 1967). This 
global pessimism was reflected in their tendency to predict equally 
low scores for themselves and for others as described by depressive 
realism. In addition, there was a trend for these individuals to 
self-enhance when given success feedback, again predicted by 
depressive realism. 
On a positive note, these low self-esteem subjects did not support 
the self-consistency model. That is, they did not predict lower scores 
for themselves (self-derogation) upon receiving informatiori contrary 
to their self-esteem (success feedback). However, this may be due to 
the majority of the low self-esteem group actually being comprised of 
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individuals with average self-esteem. Within this group there were 
only 3 subjects with self-esteem scores lower than 21. Upon 
reviewing data from one subject who was truly low in self-esteem , a 
self-derogation was seen in response to success feedback but only for 
the intelligence test. Further studies including subjects with a true 
range of high, medium and low self-esteem would enable us to test 
several of our hypotheses more effectively. 
The data also suggest modifications in the self-consistency and 
verifiability models. Contrary to the self-consistency model, subjects 
with low self-esteem did self-enhance in the morals test condition. At 
least two explanations are possible. First, as mentioned above, the 
composition of the low self-esteem group was such that it was 
comprised of moderate self-esteem individuals. However, since a 
significant difference was found for self-enhancement between the 
high and low self-esteem groups the results merit more of a 
qualitative explanation. 
A second reason for self-esteem differences may be that low 
self-esteem individuals want to self-enhance but need the security 
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that the the low verifiability gives them. It appears that they are not 
as willing to risk being caught at self-enhancing as are those with high 
self-esteem. This idea is further supported by Brown et al.'s (1988) 
finding that low self-esteem subjects would only self-enhance in 
groups for which they were vicarious members. Because they were not 
direct group members, there was less of a chance of being caught at 
self-enhancing. It appears then that both depressive realism with the 
verifiability model better explains low self-esteem behavior. 
People with high self-esteem, on the other hand, were not sensitive 
to the verifiability issue and self-enhanced regardless of test 
dimension. It may be that these individuals' need to verify their 
self-esteem is so great that they ignore important information in 
processing information about the self. This interpretation is 
consistent with previous research indicating that individuals in 
positive mood state are less likely to process information in a thorough 
and systematic fashion than are individuals in a neutral or negative 
mood state (Worth & Mackie, 1987). 
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This view is further supported by the differential-attributional 
style hypothesis (Alloy et al., 1987). According to this hypothesis, 
nondepressed individuals weight internal rather than external cues 
when making predictions about the self as compared to others. 
Depressed individuals, on the other hand, weight internal and external 
cues evenly, a perspective consistent with depressive realism. Thus, 
high self-esteem subjects may have been sensitive to internal cues 
(self-perception) and may have ignored external cues (verifiability of 
the task) in order to arrive at a decision that was consistent with their 
self-image. In other words, their rose colored glasses may be very 
dark . Therefore, the self-consistency model better predicts the 
behavior of individuals with high self-esteem. 
The findings provided by the two marginally significant three-way 
interactions are central to this thesis and are therefore worthy of 
some discussion. As mentioned above, the actual difference in 
composition between the high and low self-esteem groups were slight 
at best, and therefore finding even marginal significance was a 
surprise. The fact that these two self-esteem groups did differ in 
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their tendency to self-enhance as a function of verifiability (test 
dimension) and feedback suggests that further research is merited in 
which true high, medium and low self-esteem groups are recruited. It 
is possible that our marginally significant effects may be strengthened 
with a clearer differentiation between high and low self-esteem 
subjects. Specifically, both self-enhancement and self-derogation 
might be seen in true low self-esteem subjects as a function of 
feedback by task dimension. 
Finally, we would like to offer some possible implications of our 
data. It seems that individuals with high self-esteem are better able 
to use this technique of self-enhancement strategies under any 
circumstances. It may be helpful to monitor the self-talk of these 
individuals in order to better teach successful cognitive strategies to 
depressed individuals. What can they be thinking that makes them 
believe they are so wonderful in the face of contrary or threatening 
information? Teaching and encouraging low self-esteem individuals to 
self-enhance at first in dimensions that are not verifiable such as 
morals (Allison et al. 1989), vicarious group membership (Brown et al., 
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1988) or interpersonal behaviors (Van Lange, 1990), for example, may 
be met with less resistance. Once they are fluent with this task, it 
may be easier to move on to the riskier realm of verifiability. Though 
it has not been established what came first, self-esteem or 
self-enhancement, what is apparently working well for those with high 
self-esteem is, "if ya got it, flaunt it". 
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Directions: Each question or group of questions is based on a passage or set of conditions. In answering some of the 
questions, it may be useful to draw a rough diagram. For each question, select the best answer choice given. 
Questions 1-4 
Mrs. F. official hostess of New York City, has invited 
several wives of delegates to the United Nations for an 
infonnal luncheon. She plans to seat her eleven guests 
so that each lady will be able to converse with at least 
the person directly to her right or left. She bas prepared 
the following list. 
Mrs. F speaks English only. 
Mrs. G speaks English and French. 
Mrs. H speaks English and Russian. 
Mrs. J speaks Russian only. 
Mrs. K speaks English only. 
Mrs. L speaks French only. 
Mrs. M speaks French and German. 
Mrs. N speaks English and German. 
Mrs. 0 speaks English and French. 
Mrs. P speaks German and Russian. 
Mrs. Q speaks French and German. 
Mrs. R speaks English only. 
1. Which of the following arrangements will meet Mrs. 
Fs requirement? 
I. Fa.MPJHKGQNR 
ll. FRNLPKHJGMQO 
m. FRGJHOLMQPKN 
(A) lonly 
(B) llonly· 
(C) filonly 
(0) I and ll only 
(E) I and ill only 
2. If the ladies seated to the rigti of Mrs. P are respec-
ti\'Cly MGHKFO, who must sit at Mrs. P's left 
hand? 
(A) J 
(B) L 
(C), N 
(D) Q 
(E) R 
3. If Se¥m of the ladies baYe seaJed tbemsches in the 
. _foUowing order. NGFR<MQ, who must be the next 
lady seared? 
(A) H 
(B) J 
(C) K 
(D) L 
(E) p 
4. Mrs. F has decided upon the following seating 
arrangement: 
RKGQNFOLMPJH 
At the last minute, Mrs. H and Mrs. P inform the 
hostess that they will not be able to attend. Wbic.h of 
the following adjustments will allow Mrs. Fs seat-
ing requirements to be met? 
I. Seat Mts. J between Mrs. K and Mrs. G 
ll. Seat Mrs. J betw=n Mrs. Q and Mrs. F 
ill. Seat Mrs. J to the right of Mrs. N 
(A) lonly 
(B) illonly 
(C) I or II only 
(D) norm only 
(E) Neither 1,n, not m 
S. Senator Johnson: No argument for this bill is valid, 
because no one would argue for this bill without 
having an ulterior mo<iYC: namely, the desire for per-
sonal gain. 
The bill's sponsors would be committing the same 
CITOI' in reasoning as Senator Johnson if they 
responded by saying: 
(A) Of course we haYC ulterior motiYCS. It is per-
fectly reasonable to support ·a bill in order to 
promote our personal interests. 
(B) The fact that passing a bill would benefit its 
sponsors does not mean that the bill should 
not be passed. 
(C) The fact that Senator Johnson has substituted a 
personal attack for a discu$sion of the merits 
of the bill leads us tQ suspect that he can offer 
no strong arguments against it. 
(D) Senator Johnson has no valid reason for oppos-
ing our bill; he is only doing so because we 
helped defeat his pork-barrelling bill last 
month. 
(E) Ever)'ooc is always motivated in part by a desire 
for pc:rsonal gain; Senator Johmoo _is ~ 
exception. 
6; Father: My daughter could be a star on Broadway if 
she could only get one big break. Why, you should 
see the rave reviews she received when she was the 
lead in her high school play. 
The best way to counter the argument above would 
be to point out that 
(A) big breaks are hard to come by on Broadway 
(B) one big break does not ensure continued success 
in the theatre 
(C) the standards on Broadway arc much higher 
than they are at the high school .le\icJ 
(D) fewer plays are being produced on Broadway 
today than in the past 
(E) relatively few aspiring actors ever become 
Broadway stars 
7. Most persons who oppose gun control arc cooscna-
tives; therefore, since Kathleen fawn gun control, 
she is probably not a conscrvati\'C. 
The above argument most resembles which of the 
following? 
(A) Most sociology professors arc liberals; thcrcforc 
Dr. Williams, who is a liberal, is probably a 
. sociology professor. 
(B) Most corporation presidents own a countty 
home; if Ms. Steeples is a corporation presi-
dent, she may or may not ha't'C a country 
home. 
(C) Few major publishing finns publish much 
poetry; since Flame Press publishes only 
poetry, it is probably not a major publishing 
finn. 
(0) Most sports cars are extremely expensive; since 
the new \btus Leopard is not a sports ~ it 
is probably inexpensive. 
(E) Most desert plants are cacti; therefore the 
cholla, a desert plant, is probably a cactus. 
Questions 8-11 
The Homer Museum of American Art is open daily 
except Monday from 11 a.m. to S p.m. Tuesdays and 
Thursdays the museum remains open until 8 p.m. The 
spring special exhibitions are: .. Albert Pinkham Ryder, 
A Retrospective," which is on view from Friday, April 
24, through Sunday, May 31, in the Pollock Wing; .. Pre-
cursors of Thomas Eakins," from Friday. May 8, 
through Sunday, July 6, in the Tbiid Floor Gallery; and 
"The Hudson River School," in the John Twachtman 
Gallery, which is closed Tuesdays, from Friday, May 1, 
through Sunday\ May 24 only. The Pollock wing is 
closed Thursdays during May. 
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Saturday, and docs not wish to view more than one 
special exhibition in a day, be can sec all three sne-
cial exhibitions in the briefest time by starting ~ 
(A) 1bc Hudson Riw:r School" on a 1'lllnday 
(B) the Ryder RdrospcctiYe OD a Slbnday 
(C) "Precurscn of Eakins" «the~ Retrospec-
ti\'C 0n a 1besday 
(D) "PrccunonofW01fa~ 
(E) my edllbidoa on a SllDlday 
9. Ellen wishes to visit the three special~ Oil 
succ:esm-e llmsdays. 'Ibis ii only possible if slle 
visits 
I. the Ryder Reuospective in April 
n. 1be Hodson RM:r Sdmol" second . 
m. "Prec:unm of F.atins .. imrDecti*'Y following 
the Ryder Rdrospccti'IC 
(A) Ionly 
(B) Ilonly 
(C) I and Il only 
CD> n and m only 
CE> 1. n. and m 
10. Ralph can visit all three special exhibitions on one 
day if he goes Oil 
I. any Saturday in May 
n. the second, third, or fourth Saturday in May 
m. any Tuesday or Friday between May s and May 
22 
(A) lonly 
(B) Ilonly 
(C) Wonly 
(D) I and m only 
(E) n and m only 
11. 1my visits the "''SCUID on an afternoon six days 
after the opening of "'Ibc Hudson River School." 
Which of the special exbibitioas may be visit? 
I. The Ryder Rdrospec:ti~ 
n. ..Precunon of Eakim" . 
m. "'Ibc Humoa Riw:r School" 
(A) looly 
CB> mon1y 
(C) I and II only 
(D) D and m only 
(E) I, II, and m 
Questions 12-18 
At a symposium on the possible dangers of the industrial 
chemical PBX, du= pro-industry spokespersons are to 
be seated to the left of the moderator and three critics of 
PBX to the right of the modemor •. The speakers are Ors. 
Albert, Burris, Cathode, Durand, Ettis, and Felsenstein. 
(1) The person delivering the paper "Epidemiological 
Aspects of PBX" is seated immediately 
between Dr. Albert and Dr. Durand. 
(2) The persons delivering "Public Health and PBX" 
and '"Radiological Aspects of PBX" are close 
friends and insist on sitting together. 
(3) Felsenstein is placed two seats to the left of the 
moderator. 
(4} As heavy smoking is repugnant to the moderator, 
she insists that the person delivering "PBX: 
Benign or Malignant," a heavy smoker, be 
seated at one end of the table. 
(S) Cathode, delivering "The Impact of PBX on the 
Environment," is seated to the left of 
Felsenstein. 
(6) Albert, a critic of PBX, is seated to the left of 
Ettis. 
12. The pro-industry spokespersons are 
(A) Albert, Felsinstcin, Durand 
(B) Felsenstein, Burris, Albert 
(C) Cathode, Felsenstein, Ettis 
(D) Albert, Burris, Durand 
(E} Cathode, Felsenstcin, Burris 
13. The person seated immediately to the left of the 
moderator is 
(A) Albert 
(B) Burris 
(C) Cathode 
(D) Durand 
(E) Ettis 
14. Assuming it is one of the papers delivm:d at the 
symposium, "PBX and the Digesti\'e 1iact" must be 
by 
(A) Albert 
(B) Burris 
(C) Durand 
(D) Ettis 
(E) Felseostein 
lS. WbiCb of the following cannot be detaminc:d on the 
blSis of the informalioo given? 
I. The author of .. Public Health and PBX" 
II. The title of the paper delivered by Durand 
m. 1be identity of the two friends who insist on 
being together 
(A) looly 
(B) lonly 
<C> moo1y 
(D) I and II only 
<E> n and m only 
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bered statements are logically sufficient· to establish 
the position of Dr. Enis and the tide of the paper she 
deli\'Cl'S? 
(A) 1, 3, 4 
(B) I, 2, 3,.4 
(C) I, 3, S, 6 
(D) I, 4, 5, 6 
(E) 1, 3, 4, 5 
17. The symposium is expanded to include a seventh 
speaker. If be is seated exactly midway between 
Cathode and the moderator, he will sit 
(A) to the left of the author of ''Radiological 
Aspects of PBX" 
(B) one scat to the right of the moderator 
(C) two seats to the right of Durand 
(D) three sears. to the left of Albert 
(E) four scats to the left of the author of "PBX: 
Benign or Malignant" 
18. The symposium is further expanded to include an 
eighth speaker. If she is seared exactly midway 
between Durand and the author of "Public Health 
and PBX," which of the following must be true? 
°(A) The eighth speaker must be seated to the righl 
of the moderator. 
(B) Burris must be the author of "Radiological 
Aspects of PBX." 
(C) The eighth speaker must be seated on the same 
side of the moderator as Felsenstein. 
(D) The moderator must be seated next to the author 
of "Public Health and PBX ... 
(E) The eighth speaker must be 5eated immediately 
to the left of Ettis. 
Questions 19-22 
A is the father of two children. B and D, who arc of dif-
ferent sexes. 
C is B's spouse 
E is the same sex as D. 
Band C have two children: F, who is the same sex as B, 
and G, who is the same sex as C. 
E's mother, H, who is married to L, is the sister of D's 
motber, M. 
E and E's spouse, I. have two children, J and K, who 
are the same sex as I. 
No persons have married more than once and no chil-
dren have been born out of wc:dlock. The only restric-
tions on maniage are that marriage to a sibling, to a 
· direct descendant. or tO more than one person at the 
same time are forbidden. 
19. Fis 
(A) G's brother 
(B) G's sister 
(C) B's daughter 
(D) D's niece or ncpbcw 
(E} the same sex as H 
20. According to the rules, D can marry 
(A) -Fonly 
(B) G only 
(C) ] only 
(D). J or K only 
(E) F, J, or K 
21. IfL and H divorced, H could marry 
I. Dooly 
II F 
m. Doro 
(A) lonly 
(B) Ilonly 
(C) illonly 
(D) I or Il, but not both 
(E) n or m, but not both 
22. If the gcoc:ration of F and K's parents and their sib-
lings contains more females than males, which of the 
following must be true? 
(A) There arc more females than males in F and K's 
~­(8) ] is male. 
(C) A is the same sex as D 
(D) K and G arc the same sex. 
(E) Dis H's nephew. 
Questions 23-25 
The internal combustion engine, which powers all pri-
vate motorized vehicles, should be banned. It bums up 
petroleum products that arc needed to produce plastics, 
synthetics, and many medicines. Once all the oil is 
gone, we will no longer be able to produce these valua-
ble commodities. Yet we do not have to bum gasoline to 
satisfy our transportation needs. Other kinds of engines 
could be developed if the oil companies would stop 
I blocking research efforts. 
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23. The argument above depends OD which of the follow-
ing assumptions? 
I. We arc in imminent danger of running out 
of oil. 
n. Altt:mad~ methods of producing plastica wiD 
not be found befln the oil nins out •. 
m. If they so desiml, the oil c:0mpames c:oUl6 
deYeJop methods of trusporation not bwd OD 
the bumiag of pctroleum. 
(A) I~ 
(B) Iloaly 
(C) Jami u only 
<D> n and m on1y 
(E) I, II and ill 
24. 1be argument above would be most wealrcned by the 
deYelopment of which of the following? 
(A) An internal combusdm engine that operated on 
one-tenth the gasoline used in a normal 
engine 
(B) A car that opcrared on solar energy stored in 
special batteries · 
(C) A method of producing plastic that used no 
petroleum products 
(D) A synthetic oil with all the properties of natural 
oil 
(E) A means of locating numerous undisc~ oil 
fields 
25. The argument above would be most strengthened if 
which of the following were true? 
(A) One of the oil companies has suppressed the 
discovery of an engine that bums only 
. alcohol. 
(B) Some oftbc mcdiCines that require petroleum 
for their production help to control and cure 
several of the world's most deadly diseases. 
(C) The world's cunent oil reserves are about half 
of what they wac 30 years ago. 
(0) In high pollution areas, automobile exhaust 
fumes have been shown to cause high rates of 
lung cancer and heart disease. 
(E) When gasoline~ burned inside an auto engine·~ 
less than one-fourth of the energy produced ii 
used to propel the \'dllclc. 
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Appendix B 
Please read each problem over carefully and consider what you 
would do. In the space provided, indicate what you would do in 
the given situation and more importantly explain why/how you 
have reached this conclusion. 
1. You're on a first date with someone special at a very elegant 
restaurant with very intimidating waiters. Your filet mignon 
arrives overdone. Do you send it back to the kitchen? 
2. You work at a restaurant that serves rolls with every meal. 
Often the rolls are returned to the kitchen seemingly untouched. 
Would you serve them again? 
3. You have to go to court on a drunk driving charge. Do you tell 
your boss the truth about why you need to take the time off from 
work? 
4. You discover that you were invited to your cousin's wedding 
only because other guests canceled out •. Do you still go? 
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5. You're driving at night. The car behind you is blinding you 
with its high beams. Finally, the car passes you and is now 
ahead of you. Do you turn your high beams on? 
6. Trying to impress your newest date, you tell him/her that 
you're an expert skier when you're really only a beginner. He/She 
surprises you with a ski weekend at a new resort. Do you tell 
him/her you "snowed" him/her before you leave on the trip? 
7. Your father is having an affair. Your mother is unaware of it. 
Do you tell her? 
8. A friend, whom you're very competitive with, signs up for an 
outdoor survival program-the challenge is to spend three days 
and nights alone in the woods. Your friend dares you to test your 
resources in the same program. Would you? 
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9. You've always been attracted to your best friend's 
boy/girlfriend. They just broke up! Would you ask your best 
friend's ex out on a date? 
10. Friends loan you a few movies for you VCR. One mislabeled 
tape shows your friends frolicking nude on a beach. Do you 
watch the rest of the "vacation" tape? 
11. A radio talk show host you've been listening to for years 
makes an insulting remark about people of your ethnic heritage 
on the air. Do you call the radio station to complain? 
12. You and your boy/girlfriend have an intense sexual 
relationship. Your lover calls at work requesting a brief 
romantic interlude at a friend's nearby apartment. You must 
make up an excuse and leave work to keep the rendezvous. Do 
you?· 
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13. An overweight friend complains about the poor workmanship 
of clothes because seams often pull out and zippers always 
break. Do you suggest that losing weight might help? 
14. Your current boy/girlfriend asks you how many 
boy/girlfriends you've had in the past. Do you tell the truth? 
15. You're in a busy shoe store and are anxious to be served. The 
sales clerk begins to wait on you before another customer who 
was there longer. Do you refer the clerk to the other customer? 
16. You're seated in a non-smoking section of an airplane. Two 
seats away in the same non-smoking section, a passenger lights 
up. Do you ask the smoker to put out the cigarette? 
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17. From your living room window, you see two members of a 
particular religious sect walking towards your door. The group 
is dedicated to making converts. Do you pretend you are not 
home? 
18. An artist friend gives you one of her framed paintings as a 
gift. You're not wild about the piece, but she frequently stops by 
your dorm room for a visit. Do you hang it? 
19. You have just earned a degree in biology. Your best job offer 
comes from a laboratory that does experiments on live animals. 
Do you accept the job? 
20. Passing a playground you witness two young children having 
a vicious fight. Do you intervene? 
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1Qf the 77 students, 2 were African-American, 2 were 
Asian-American and the remaining 73 were Caucasian. Of those 
responding, 45 considered themselves Protestant, 22 Catholic, 2 
Agnostic, 2 "none" and 1 Jewish. Forty-eight considered themselves 
upper-middle class, 25 middle class and 2 lower-middle class. 
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Mean Performance Predictions as a Function of Self-Esteem and Target 
Self-Esteem 
High 
Low 
Target 
Self 
77.01 
(20.47) 
70.59 
(20.06) 
Other 
68.93 
(19.57) 
68.91 
(17.04) 
NQm. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
Table 2· 
Mean Performance Predictions as a Function of 
Test Pimension and Taraet 
Dimension 
Intelligence 
Morals 
Target 
Self 
70.30 
(22.48) 
77.30 
(18.34) 
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Other 
68.49 
(21.02) 
69.35 
(15.49) 
N.Qm. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
Table 3 
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Mean Performance Predictions as a Function of Test Dimension. 
Self-Esteem and Target 
Target 
Dimension Self Other 
High Self-Esteem 
Intelligence 74.08 66.39 
(24.43} (24.77} 
Morals 79.94 71.47 
(17.49} (15.34} 
Low Self-Esteem 
Intelligence 66.53 70.59 
(20.78} (18.46} 
Morals 74.66 67.23 
(19.09} (15.68) 
NQm. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
